In previous topics, I discussed scripted deviation callouts and unscripted deviation callouts. The third category is calling out risky decisions – the most challenging or Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties. From Master Airline Pilot – pages 371-373:
Calling out a risky decision is more difficult because it highlights the differences between the PM’s opinion and the PF’s decision/game plan. It’s no longer just about factual parameters a. By questioning the quality of their decisions, we risk appearing confrontational. We need to resolve these issues skillfully. Start with facts. Each pilot can perceive similar facts, yet draw different conclusions. Consider a situation where our flight is navigating around some towering thunderstorms. The PF has selected a course that flies, in our opinion, too close to a menacing buildup. We are uncomfortable and want to say something. How can we proceed?
- Assess the conditions: Recognize that our decision is based on our experience, our perception of conditions, and our risk assessment. The PF has selected their course based on their experience, their perception of conditions, and their risk assessment. Something has generated a mismatch between our mental models. If we can uncover the source of this mismatch, we can address it directly. Perhaps the PF lacks experience with maneuvering around towering buildups (inexperience). Perhaps they are overlooking important conditions that would otherwise change their assessment (missing information). Perhaps they perceive the same conditions that we do, but weigh their importance differently (risk assessment). Maybe they are just more risk tolerant than we are (risk management). At first, we really don’t know. To restore our shared mental model, we need to initiate a discussion. A good place to start is to assemble the facts and understand how we each formed our particular mindsets. If the PF is an experienced Captain, the selected course is based on their wealth of experience and past success, so they might be right and we might be wrong. As we investigate deeper, we notice a strong crosswind component blowing toward the closer buildup. Given that additional piece of information, the selected course makes sense. We see that the PF has chosen a course that shaves closer/upwind to one buildup and further/downwind from another buildup. The selected path will probably have the smoothest ride while avoiding any hail that the further/downwind buildup may be generating. Given this information, we change our opinion and accept the PF’s decision. If, however, their chosen course is actually downwind from the close buildup, then a different consideration must be driving the PF’s decision. We notice that their chosen course tracks closer to the magenta-line flight planned course. We conclude that the PF may be trying to shorten the flight distance to save time, even though it risks a turbulent ride. Their chosen course accepts the increased risk from the buildup to shorten the air miles flown. In our opinion, this decision is riskier, so we decide to speak up and offer a safer alternative.
- Clearly present our reasoning: We clarify the facts as we see them and organize our reasons why a different course might be better. We frame the scenario by stating that we are uncomfortable with flying so close to the buildup because of the downwind hazards. “This course seems too close to that buildup. I’m concerned about turbulence and hail. Also, the flight attendants are still up finishing the passenger service.” Ideally, the PF agrees with our reasoning and alters course. If the PF doesn’t share our concerns, we expand the discussion. We may need to add more facts to convince the PF to alter course. Perhaps their risk management has drifted over time to accept higher levels of risk. Discussions like this recalibrate our thinking and return us to a safer standard. Let’s ratchet up the scenario further. After voicing our concerns, the PF still elects to continue with the risky course. If we are the Captain, we can override the FO’s decision and direct the safer course. If we are the FO, our options are more difficult.
- Offer a safer alternative: Assuming the Captain/PF won’t accept our concerns, suggest a safer alternative. One tactic is to highlight better options. “Flying to the left of that buildup keeps us upwind of the turbulence and any hail that the buildup may be throwing out. However, if you want to stay on this heading, I’d like to have the flight attendants immediately take their seats.” If our airline is using a risk management system like Risk and Resource Management (RRM), we can include a color code. “This course puts me in the Red. About 20 degrees to the left feels safer to me.” Notice in these two statements, we stick to either factual statements or our personal opinions. This is what I feel and this is what I need. Most Captains value a cohesive flightdeck team. Most will bend to our concerns when they understand that the issue is important to us. Avoid accusatory statements and undertones. “You are flying us directly toward the severe turbulence and hail from that buildup.” “You are about to hurt some flight attendants when we hit the turbulence from that buildup.” Statements like these link their decision with bad outcomes. The implied message is, “Bad things are about to happen and they will be your fault.” If necessary, this option is still available to make our point. If the Captain is particularly headstrong and resistant to our input and we have tried persuasion without success, this may be a useful tactic to get them to do the right thing.
Notice how PM callouts are distributed along a continuum of complexity and difficulty. On one extreme are simple scripted deviation callouts like “Airspeed” and “Sink Rate”. These are factual, clearly modeled in our manuals, and easily understood. Near the middle of our continuum are unscripted deviation callouts like “Come Right. We are drifting toward the edge of the taxiway.” These callouts cover a wide range of events that require us to detect unfavorable trends and highlight emerging hazards. These require judgment, communication skills, and effective CRM. An important aspect is time available. The earlier we identify the trend, the more time we will have to rebuild a shared mental model, agree on a remedy, and modify our path. The most common problem we see in these kinds of mishaps is reluctance to speak up (see the previous Topic 23-6: PM Callouts and Consent by Silence). On the other end of our callout continuum are risky decisions. Here the “facts” are usually known by both pilots, but they disagree on the significance of the conditions and the probability of hazardous outcomes. As FOs, we are tasked to initiate a process that may lead to direct intervention. In many mishap events, FOs report their discomfort with their PFs’ risky decisions, but lacked the skills to communicate them effectively or waited until too late (while hoping that their Captains would recognize their error and self-correct their unfavorable path). This is why it is important to mentally rehearse these types of scenarios. Rehearsal reduces hesitation and improves callout word choice. This leads to better CRM and event outcomes.
